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NoTEs
instituting foreclosure naming the United States as a party defendant.
If the United States is not made a party to an action affecting property
in which the United States has an interest, judicial sale resulting from
that action will have the same effect on the federal lien as state law
provides for other liens of similar standing. 21 In other words the federal
lien is not effected.
Authority for a suit against the United States in cases where the
United States has an interest in the property involved comes from title
28, U.S.C.A. Sec. 2410. The action may be brought in the state district
court, or in federal district court. If brought in the state court, the action
may be removed to the federal district court upon an appropriate motion
22
by the United States.
If the United States has a lien senior to the one satisfied by the sale,
the lien of the United States will not be disturbed by the sale unless the
United States consents that the property may be sold free of its lien and
28
the United States gets the share of the proceeds to which it is entitled.
JOHN V. CROW

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND
EXPENSES FOR THE CONSERVATION OF PROPERTY
HELD FOR THE PRODUCTION OF INCOME
In 1941 a taxpayer was involved with extensive investments in real
estate, bonds and stocks. In pursuit of these interests he hired others to
assist him in offices rented for that purpose. For the tax years in question,
he claimed that salaries and expenses incident to looking after his properties were deductible under Section 23 (a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code, which provided for deduction of all ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
The court held that the taxpayer merely kept records and collected interest
and dividends from his securities and could not be considered as carrying
on a trade or business, and disallowed the deduction.'
Such reasoning by the courts seemed unduly harsh, since a person receiving income was charged with his gross receipts and not allowed to set
21.
22.
23.

1.

United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 74 S.Ct. 367, 98 L.Ed., 520 (1954).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1444.
The government's rights to share in the proceedings of a judicial sale are as any
other lienor, "first in time, first in right." Supra notes 13, 14, and 23. As between
the federal tax lien and the lien of any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment
creditor, the priority is to be determined as of the date of first recording. 9
Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 54.42. As between the federal tax
lien and all other liens, the relative priority of the federal lien is determined as
of the date of assessment, and the private liens as of the date of perfection. State
law determines what constitutes a perfected lien. 9 Mertens, Law of Federal Income
Taxation § 54.40.
Higgens v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 61 S.Ct. 728, 85 L.Ed. 1145 (1941).
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off the expenses incurred in obtaining those receipts. 2 To mitigate the
harshness of this rule, Congress in 1942 amended Section 23 (a). This
amendment was carried over as Section 212 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code which provides as follows:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year
(1) for the production or collection of income,
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or
refund of any tax.
It was not, however, the intention of Congress in drafting this amendment to remove any of the other restrictions and limitations applicable to
deductions connected with trade or business which existed prior to the
amendment. 3 One such limitation with which we are concerned was set
forth in Section 24 (a) (2) and prohibited any deduction under Section
23 (a) for capital expenditures. This limitation was carried forward and
now appears as Section 263 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and continues to be a limitation on all deductions whether for trade or business
4
or for an individual holding property for the production of income.
With the birth of Section 212, much difficulty arose in distinguishing
between a capital expenditure and an expenditure for the conservation of
property held for the production of income. The difficulty of making the
distinction was apparently due to the literal interpretation of the word
"conservation," which resulted in the conclusion that the meaning embraced many expenditures which had theretofore been described as capital
expenditures.
The distinction is one of importance. If the expense can be qualified
under Section 212, it may be deducted as a whole in the taxable year in
which it arose, and this may be an advantage in some instances. On the
other hand, classification of the expenditure under Section 263 constitutes
a capital charge which in the case of non-depreciable property, must be added to the adjusted basis of the property and taken into account in computing
capital gain or loss on subsequent sale. 5 If the property is depreciable,
the expenditure can only be recovered through annual depreciation
deductions spread over the useful life of the property. 6
In making a distinction between a capital expenditure and an expense
for the conservation of property held for the production of income, it is
advisable first to consider the import of the term "capital expenditure"
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Commissioner v. Heide, 165 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948).
S. Rep. 1683, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 88, H. Rep. 233, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 75; Bowers
v. Lumpkin, 140 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1944).
Reg. 1.212-2- (n).
I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011, 1016.
I.R.C. § 167.
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under the Income Tax Regulations. It is stated there that the term
generally applies to property owned by the taxpayer with a useful life
substantially beyond the taxable year, and includes amounts paid or
incurred to (1) acquire, replace, alter, develop, improve, or otherwise
add to the value of the property, (2) to substantially prolong the useful
life of the property, or (3) to adopt the property to a new or different
use. 7 This definition has been supported to a great extent by the courts
in their efforts to distinguish between a capital expenditure and an
ordinary expense.8
Consideration will now be given to the interpretation of the word
"conservation" in Section 212 of the Internal Revenue Code. Webster
defines "conservation" as preserving, guarding, protecting, or keeping in
a safe or entire state. The rule is well established that words of common
usage should be given their usual and ordinary meaning of signification
according to approved usage. 9 Could it not be considered then, by Webster's definition, that the cost of a new roof upon a building is a cost
undertaken for the preservation of the building? If the need of a new
roof were ignored, the building itself would probably soon fall into disrepair and the taxpayer would be robbed of its usefulness for the production of income. Is the taxpayer not permitted to preserve this building
by adding a new roof and deducting the expense under Section 212? The
court in Georgia Car and Locomotive Co. v. Commissioner,'0 said that the
new roof was a replacement which prolonged the life of the building in
excess of one year and the cost thereof should be treated as a capital
expenditure. The expenses of rebuilding the stern of a barge, because
some of the woodwork has rotted away, seems to be very necessary to keep
the barge in a safe or entire state, and to preserve it for further use; howIn
ever, such an expense was held to have been a capital expenditure."
the case of Black Hardware Co. v. Commissioner" the court went to
extremes in the application of the definition of capital expenditure. The
7.
8.

9.

Reg. 1263 (a) -I and 2.
P. Dougherty v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 791 (1945), expenses of rebuilding the stern
of a barge was a permanent betterment. Page v. Kelm, 128 F.Supp. 14 (D. Minn.
1955), new parts added to an elevator constituted a long range improvement.
Nachman v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1204 (1949), affirmed 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.
1951), premium paid for liquor license held to be an expense for the acquisition
of an asset. I.T. 1309, C.B. June 1922, P. 196, where costs of installing machinery
and the freight and handling charges thereon were held to be capital expenditures
because in acquisition of assets. Rev. Rul. 56-520, C.B. 1956-2, P. 170, where costs
of seeking an award of television channel were held to be capital expenditures,
because incurred in acquiring an asset. Young v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 691 (9th
Cir. 1932), cost of destroying old buildings to make room for new changed the use

of the asset and expenses were for the procurement of the new asset.
Bullock v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 440 (1932), where cost of moving
house to a residential area increased the value of the new property and
to be a capital expenditure.
Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 45 S.Ct. 73, 69 L.Ed. 265 (1924) ; Allen

John G.
dwelling
was held

v. Mors-

man, 46 F.2d 891 (8th Cir, 1931) ; U.S. v. Burnett, 53 F.2d 219 (D. Mo. 1931).

10.
11.
12.

2 B.T.A. 986 (1925).
Supra note 8; P. Dougherty v. Commissioner.
39 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1925).
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taxpayer lived in Galveston, Texas, which is periodically visited by storms
of great violence. In 1919 a committee of businessmen recommended that
the entire city level be raised to twelve and one-half feet above sea level.
Taxpayer raised the lower floor of his building approximately four and
one-half feet which was sufficient to protect it against the highest flood
tides. In denying the rehearing the Circuit Court of Appeals admitted
that the expenditures did not prolong the life of the building nor increase
its value as a building, but that the improvements protected the building
against future storms. The court went on to say that because of this
protection the building was more valuable and the expense was therefore
a capital expenditure.
To say that all of the aforementioned expenditures were incurred
for the protection, safe keeping or preservation of property would indeed
be the result of a literal application of the word "conservation." It is even
more difficult to understand why the courts refuse to apply the term in
the case of attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of title to property. In
the case of Lumpkin v. Bowers,13 Justice Timmerman expressed his inability to understand just how one could conserve, maintain, and manage
property held for production of income, if the title thereto could not be
defended from an unwarranted attack made upon it, and held that expenses
incurred in the defense of title were deductible under Section 212.
The Circuit Court of Appeals later reversed the decision reiterating
that it was not the intention of Congress in amending Section 23 (a) of
the Internal Revenue Code to remove restrictions and limitations applicable
to deductions under Section 23 (a) prior to the amendment, and prior to
the amendment, it was firmly established that legal expenses involved in
defending or protecting title to property were not ordinary and necessary
expenses, but capital expenditures.
Since the reversal of Lumpkin v. Bowers,14 it has been well settled
law that expenses for the defense or perfection of title are capital expenditures for the purposes of Section 212. This position can be reconciled
however, by considering the previous definitions of capital expenditures,
with particular reference to the fact that all expenses incurred in the
acquisition of property are capital expenditures. Learned Hand in Commissioner v. Field,15 indicated that we cannot forget that a disputed right
is no right at all. Consequently any expenditures involved in acquiring
an undisputable title may be considered costs of acquiring an asset and
are therefore capital expenditures.
A contrary position might appear to have been taken in L. B. Reakirt
13.
14.
15.

50 F.Supp. 874 (E.D.S.C. 1943), reversed 140 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1944), Cert. denied
322 U.S. 755.
Commissioner v. Field, 42 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1930); Huchings v. Burnett, 58 F.2d
514 (D.D.C. 1932); Browner v. Burnett, 63 F.2d 129 (D.D.C. 1933).
42 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1930).
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v. Commissioner.16 There a taxpayer resisted an illegal attempt by a city
to condemn and acquire certain of his property. The court held that
the litigation was not in defense of title or to perfect petitioner's title;
as a matter of fact, the effectiveness of the condemnation, if successful
depended on the validity of title. The action was to enjoin the taking of
the land itself, hence the expenses of defending the suit were not capital
expenditures.
After applying the natural meaning of the word "conservation" to
several expenditures which would ordinarily seem to be embraced by that
term, it has been found that the court has labelel them capital expenditures
and not deductible under Section 212 as expenses for the conservation of
income producing property; therefore, we will next consider the interpretation of the meaning given to the word "conservation" under Section 212,
by the regulations and decisions of the court.
At the outset it may be advisable to point out that in addition to
qualifying the expenditure as one for the conservation of income producing
property, it must have been paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the
taxable year, and it must be ordinary and necessary. It should also be noted
that the expenditure is for the conservation of property held for the production of income. 17 Thus the taxpayer must have undisputed title to the
property before Section 212 will apply.
Looking further for a legal definition of "conservation" we find that
it is to preserve in its existing state from change or destruction, to oversee,
guard or shield.18 The application of this definition is illustrated very
well in the case of Baer v. Commissioner.19 In a divorce settlement the
petitioner's wife made a demand for payment in excess of $1,000,000.
Petitioner's estate consisted largely of stock in a company of which he had
control. To make the payment, petitioner would have had to sell a considerable amount of the stock thereby losing control of the company. The
court held that the attorney fees paid in defending the action was for the
conservation of property held for the production of income and was
deductible in full. Also where the Railroad Commission of the State of
16.
17.
18.
19.

29 B.T.A. 1296 (1934).
Edmunds v. U.S., 71 F.Supp. 29 (E.D. Mo. 1947) ; Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d
982 (8th Cir. 1944).
Levin v. Mede, 72 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1947); Hill v. Bank of San Pedro, 107 P.2d 399

(1940); 15 C.J.S. 984.

196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952); and Northern Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 251
(7th Cir. 1954), where taxpayer sued to prevent the assessment of wrongful estate
taxes against his property. Expenses incurred by taxpayer in successfully contesting
the government's claim was for the conservation of income producing property.
See also Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947). Here the petitioner made loans
to executives of a company controlled by the petitioner. If she did not make the
loans, the executives would be forced to sell large blocks of their stock in the
company, thereby depressing the value of petitioner's stock. The expenses incurred
in seeking advice from attorneys, relative to the loans were held to be deductible
as conservation expenses. In Straub v. Granger, 143 F.Supp. 250 (W.D. Pa. 1956),
attorney fees paid for advice on how to protect taxpayer's interest from existing
management were held to be for the conservation of income producing property
and deductible.
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Texas issued an order regulating production of oil and gas in the producing zones where taxpayers' leases were located, the court said that although
the primary purpose of oil and gas restrictions imposed by the State of
Texas was the conservation of the natural resources of the state, the effect
was to conserve the oil and gas interests of individual owners and lessees,
20
therefore the costs of securing the order were deductible.
In Fredrick E. Rowe v. Commissioner,2 1 a dispute arose between the
executors and the life tenant of a trust with respect to the method of allocating the proceeds of sale of oil and gas runs between income and corpus.
The petitioner held a vested remainder in the trust and contends that the
executor had properly set aside part of the income as corpus, in the form
of reserves for depreciation and depletion of that corpus. The court said
the vested remainder was properly held for the production of income and
the fees were in conservation of that remainder.
22
A very curious case is that of J. H. Collingwood v. Commissioner,
in which a farmer terraced his farm lands to prevent erosion. In the
opinion the court stated that nothing new had been added to the soil;
the same crops were raised after terracing as before: no new farming areas
were developed; no clearing of the land of work to prepare land for cultivation took place; the terracing work did not change the fertility of the
soil, or make farming operations easier; nor did it increase the value of the
land or its products. Therefore, the expenses were not capital expenditures
but were for the conservation of income producing property.

Other expenses said to be for the conservation of income producing
property are expenses for the rental of a safety-deposit box where investment securities were kept, 23 and insurance and storage charges for a lot
24
of turpentine bought on speculation.
With exception to the Collingwood case the decisions will obviously
reveal no relationship to capital expenditures. None of them has increased
the life or value of the property under consideration, nor have they been
incurred in the acquisition or adaptation of the property; however, they
would all bear recognition by application of the accepted legal definition
of conservation, i.e., the act of preserving in the existing state from change
or destruction.
It is apparent that the court.went to great lengths in that case to avoid
labeling the costs as capital expenditures, and undoubtedly did so because
of the tendency of the tax court to be lenient toward farmers. Their
desire to escape the language of Section 263 in the case of farmers probably
20.
21.

Campbell v. Fields, 229 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1956).
24 T.C. 382 (1955). See Nancy Reynolds Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947), where expenses
paid for advice and services in planning an estate were held to be for the conservation of income producing property and deductible.

22.
23.
24.

20 T.C. 937 (1953).
Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 944), Cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755.
Higgins v. U.S., 75 F.Supp. 252 (C.C. 1948).
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led to Section 175, first adopted in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which
allows a deduction to taxpayers engaged in the business of farming for
expenditures incurred for soil conservation or for the prevention of
25
erosion of land used in farming.
In conclusion, it would appear that the distinguishing factors between
an expense for the conservation of income producing property under Section 212 and a capital expenditure under Section 263 are: (1) an expense
incurred for the acquisition of property, with a useful life of over one year
is a capital expenditure; whereas an expense deductible under Section 212
must be to conserve property held for the production of income, and (2)
a capital expenditure under Section 263 must be one which changes the
physical structure of the property, which results in an increased value or
life of the property, or adapts the property to a different use, whereas, an
expense to be deductible under Section 212 does not change in any way
the physical state of the property. On the contrary the expenses must be
to protect, shield, guard, or preserve the property in its existing state.
THOMAS S. SMITH

THE EXPANDING STATE JUDICAL POWER
OVER NON-RESIDENTS
The ultimate expansion to date of state judicial power over nonresidents was recently announced by the Supreme Court of the United
States in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.1 The Court upheld
a California statute 2 subjecting foreign insurance corporations to suit in
California on an insurance contract with a California resident even though
the insurer could not be served with process within the state. The insured
purchased a life insurance policy from the defendant. He accepted the
policy and paid the premiums by mail from California to the defendant's
principal office in Texas. When the insured died the defendant refused
to pay the claim to the insured's wife as beneficiary. The wife was granted
a default judgment in California after serving process upon the defendant
by registered mail in Texas. Unable to collect the judgment she filed
suit upon it in Texas. The Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment,
holding that it was void since the California court had no jurisdiction
over the defendant insurance company. The defendant apparently had
never solicited or done business in California except for the policy involved
here. On certiorari the Supreme Court held that the California Court had
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant within the requirements of due
process; the judgment was therefore entitled to full faith and credit. It
25.

1.
2.

I.R.C. § 174.

55 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed. 223 (1957).
Cal. Insurance Code §§ 1610 to 1620

(1953).

